Mule Accounts in Digital Fraud Criminal Liability of Account Holders Between Participation and Money Laundering

Abstract

The growth of digital banking, electronic wallets, and internet-based payment systems has expanded access to financial services while creating new opportunities for cyber-economic crime. Because offenders must still cash out the proceeds of digital fraud, they increasingly rely on accounts belonging to other persons—known as mule accounts, to separate criminal proceeds from the identity of the principal offender. By 14 July 2026, the Indonesia Anti-Scam Centre had received 608,167 reports and identified more than one million accounts reportedly connected with fraud. This scale raises a legal problem: holders are not a uniform category, ranging from knowing participants to victims of hacking or identity theft, and formal account ownership alone cannot establish fault. This study examines the legal status of mule-account holders within digital-fraud schemes and the criminal liability they bear for receiving and transferring fraud proceeds under Indonesian money-laundering law. The study is normative legal research employing statutory, conceptual, and hypothetical-case approaches. It analyses the participation provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of Law No. 1 of 2023 (the National Criminal Code), which entered into force on 2 January 2026, together with Article 607 governing money laundering and the provisions of Law No. 8 of 2010 that remain in force, as confirmed by Law No. 1 of 2026. The analysis shows that a holder may be classified as a joint perpetrator where there is close, conscious cooperation from the outset; as an accessory where the holder intentionally supplies banking means without close involvement in execution, carrying a maximum penalty of two-thirds of the principal penalty under Article 21(3); or as not liable for the predicate offence where the account is misused without knowledge or intention. Under Article 607, active money laundering arises from dealings intended to conceal the origin of proceeds, while passive money laundering under Article 607(1)(c) requires only receipt or control of property known or reasonably suspected to be criminal proceeds. Enforcement should prioritise the holder’s factual role and mental state over the name recorded in banking records, allowing knowing facilitators to be held proportionately liable while protecting genuine victims of account misuse.